State Of Denial

In March 2006, Rumsfeld invited six of the Pentagon’s regular outside advisers in to be briefed and ask questions. One was Ken Adelman, a longtime Rumsfeld friend and vehement early supporter of the war who had become entirely disillusioned over the administration’s handling of the postwar. His relationship with Rumsfeld was almost over.

“What metrics would you use for success in Iraq?” Adelman asked Rumsfeld. “You know, for winning the war?”

“Oh, there are hundreds,” Rumsfeld replied. “It’s just so complicated that there are hundreds.”

“Wait a minute,” Adelman insisted. “A former boss of mine always said identify three or four things, then always ask about, get measurements and you’ll get progress or else you’ll never get any progress.” The former boss was Rumsfeld himself, who had driven the point home to Adelman 35 years ago, when he worked for Rumsfeld at the Office of Economic Opportunity. What are they? Adelman insisted.

Rumsfeld said it was so complicated that he could not give a list. “Hundreds,” he insisted.

Adelman believed that meant there was a total lack of accountability. If Rumsfeld didn’t agree to any criteria, he couldn’t be said to have failed on any criteria.

“Then you don’t have anything,” Adelman said. He left as dis­turbed as ever. There was no accountability.